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“O lawful let it be/ That I have room .... to curse awhile”:  Voicing the Nation’s Conscience in 
Female Complaint in Richard III, King John and Henry VIII 
          Alison Thorne 
 
                             God’s wrong is most of all. 
If thou didst feared to break an oath with him, 
The unity the king my husband made 
Thou hadst not broken, nor my brothers died. 
If thou hadst feared to break an oath by him, 
Th’imperial metal circling now thy head 
Had graced the tender temples of my child, 
And both the princes had been breathing here, 
Which now ‐ two tender bedfellows for dust ‐ 
Thy broken faith hath made the prey for worms. 
(Richard III, 4.4.308‐317)1 
 
In the speech quoted above Queen Elizabeth unmasks Richard’s pledge to atone for the murder of her 
two young sons by marrying her daughter for the travesty of reparation it is by reciting the crimes he 
has committed against his own family and the body politic. This incident, one of many such moments in 
the three plays examined here, bears witness to the oppositional role assumed by aggrieved royal 
women in some of the earliest and the last of Shakespeare’s chronicle plays: Richard III, King John and 
Henry VIII (the latter co‐authored with John Fletcher). In particular, it serves to highlight the inter‐
related functions of these characters as custodians of England’s troubled history whose memory is 
continually at risk of being erased or over‐written, as defenders of the national interest in the face of 
                                                             
1 All references to Shakespeare’s texts are taken from The Norton Shakespeare, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et 
al. (New York and London, 1997). 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lawlessness and tyranny, and above all as tireless agitators for justice. Although we might expect these 
good offices to be recognised as such by modern playgoers and readers in a post‐feminist age, this has 
rarely been the case. More often, the formidable matrons of Shakespeare’s Lancastrian cycle and King 
John, in particular, have met with a hostile critical reception that tends, ironically, to concur with the 
views of the male characters in regarding their activities as thoroughly detrimental to the nation’s 
welfare. As Nina Levine notes, the military and political activism of viragos such as Margaret of Anjou 
and Eleanor of Aquitaine, like the supposedly overweening ambition of Constance, has been widely 
perceived to constitute a ‘threat to order and stability’ that ‘must be brought under control for the good 
of the nation’.2  
Without wishing to deny the obvious affinities between these disaffected female characters and the 
early modern stereotype of the unruly woman ‐ as evidenced by their typically vociferous, self‐willed 
and disruptive manner of communicating their views, their general propensity to excess and intolerance 
of patriarchal regulation3 ‐ it is, I think, regrettable that these traits have too often been allowed to 
obscure the salutary effects of such wayward behaviour. Focusing on Margaret and the other wailing 
queens of Richard III, Constance in King John and Katherine in Henry VIII, this essay will argue the need 
for a more nuanced assessment of the motives behind their interventions in public life and of their 
contribution to the moral and political welfare of the nation. This requires that we make a conscious 
effort to redirect our attention to the more positive aspects of the women’s role in the management of 
the commonweal without overlooking their involvement in the abuse of dynastic, political and judicial 
systems that is endemic to the play‐worlds they inhabit. In particular, it means attending to the 
therapeutic effect of their intercessions in ministering to the healing of a nation at odds with itself:  a 
                                                             
2 Nina Levine, Women’s Matters: Politics, Gender, and Nation in Shakespeare’s Early History Plays 
(Newark, 1998), p. 16.  See also Jean Howard and Phyllis Rackin, Engendering A Nation: A Feminist 
Account of Shakespeare’s English Histories (London, 1997), esp. Chaps 5‐6. 
3 On this topic see Nathalie Zemon Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France (London, 1975), 
Chap. 5 (‘Women on Top’). 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process primarily enacted, I submit, in their commitment to perpetuating the memory of past crimes 
that still cry out for redress in defiance of a governing elite intent on suppressing ‘the sad remembrance 
of those wrongs’ (Richard III, 4.4.238),  and their tenacity in working to expose institutional corruption in 
the higher echelons of state by calling to account those whose power and status seemingly place them 
beyond  reach of the law.   
To understand what drives this female‐led quest for justice we must situate this as a response to the 
traumas of the recent past which still convulse the respective play‐worlds, whether the legacy of 
internecine strife from the War of the Roses that imprints itself upon the fractured court of Richard III, 
the unresolved struggle over the succession in King John, or the upheavals of the English Reformation in 
Henry VIII. Each of these plays evokes a profoundly dysfunctional society where the normal patrilineal 
structures of authority and legitimate succession have broken down, where oaths are routinely violated, 
theology is manipulated for political gain, and the law perverted to serve the will of individuals, instead 
of the bono publico.  What is undeniably catastrophic for the body politic, though, proves oddly enabling 
for the plays’ female protagonists. Along with the Bastard in King John and Richmond in Richard III, they 
become unlikely beneficiaries of the turbulent times dramatised in our three plays and the opportunities 
they generate for those normally disqualified from the exercise of power to become political players in 
their own right. Of course it may well strike us as thoroughly implausible that these female characters, 
who despite their royal status are multiply marked as outsiders by virtue of their sex, their discontent, 
their tenuous position and, in many cases, foreign origins, should come to play such a prominent role in 
state affairs. Nevertheless several factors conspire to propel them, both literally and metaphorically, to 
the centre of the public stage.     
For a start, England is represented in each play as experiencing something of an identity crisis. Evidence 
of this self‐estrangement abounds on both an individual and national level. Consider the defection of 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Richard’s subjects, both living and dead, to the cause of Richmond, a Welshman who returns to his 
native soil as a foreign exile at the head of a Breton‐backed invasion. In King John the French King’s 
claims to have the true interests of England more at heart than its titular monarch, and the subsequent 
decision of the English nobility, disillusioned by John’s surrender of the kingdom’s sovereignty to Rome, 
to ally themselves with the Dauphin’s invading army can also be seen as symptomatic of an erosion of 
national identity.  These ironies are ratcheted up still further when Henry VIII, the monarch famed 
alongside King John for asserting England’s independence from external, that is to say papal, domination 
elects to disguise himself at the masque, both linguistically and sartorially, as a Frenchman, thus 
participating in the affectation of foreign manners roundly deplored by Henry’s own courtiers, while his 
Spanish‐born wife insists on addressing the cardinals in the English tongue rather than Latin as an act of 
fealty to her adoptive country (3.1.41‐9 ).  Given this perplexing, ever‐shifting  alignment of national 
loyalties, it is perhaps not so odd, after all, that the task of articulating England’s malaise should fall 
upon the female characters, not only natives but strangers too such as Margaret of Anjou and Katherine 
of Aragon.  
The women’s colonisation of the stage of history is also facilitated by the absence of agreed political 
codes or a properly functional judicial apparatus. While the concept of justice is repeatedly brandished 
in these plays, its presence proves elusive. Indeed the frequency with which this idea is evoked  – 
whether through the mimetic recreation of judicial processes in the elaborately staged trial scenes of 
Henry VIII, the constant disputation of  legal issues or the characters’ habit of slipping into lawyerly 
discourse – is in inverse proportion to its realisation on stage. For, in each of these plays, the due 
process of law is curtailed, perverted by bias, false testimony or interference, or simply overridden.4 It is 
                                                             
4 This is shown most clearly in the peremptory justice Richard meets out to his victims, none of whom are 
granted so much as a formal indictment (or only posthumously in Hasting’s case), let alone a trial. But 
Henry VIII also curtails due process of the law, e.g., by prejudging Buckingham’s guilt on the basis of his 
5 
 
this situation, I shall argue, that incites Shakespeare’s royal women to occupy the discursive space 
vacated by the collapse of these institutional structures and leads them to enlist the rhetorical resources 
of complaint in order to supplement and correct a judicial system that has failed them.  Armed only with 
this linguistic weapon, they take the highly unorthodox step of usurping the law’s office by personally 
confronting known or suspected malefactors with evidence of their misdeeds. In so doing they 
unwittingly act in consort with the female complainants of the other plays who similarly assume the 
informal roles of prosecutor, judge and jury.5 Thus the plaintive accents of the plays’ female 
protagonists emerge as, if by no means the sole, certainly the most insistent  voice calling for a greater 
degree of moral and political accountability. 
The following discussion will examine how this dramatic community of disaffected women navigates the 
conflict‐scarred political landscapes of these plays in the pursuit of justice. Attending to the ambiguous 
relationship between the plaintive female voice and the act of truth‐telling, it will argue that their 
unstable alliance operates as a crucial index of the health of the body politic as well as providing a 
necessary, albeit far from infallible, moral compass for theatre audiences and readers adrift in the plays’ 
murky and unpredictable waters. From there it goes on to assess the efficacy of female complaint and 
its lachrymose twin, lamentation, as a remedy for various forms of ethical, political and legal 
malpractice. Addressing this key issue gives rise to others. To what extent can the vocalisation of 
discontent, however eloquent, compensate for the damage wrought by corrupt and discredited  
institutions? What is the relation between complaint and the law? Can justice only emerge from within 
the private recesses of the individual soul? Or does it require a communal event, an enactment of the 
collective will to preserve the memory of history’s victims and arraign the living culprits, of the sort 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
surveyor’s tainted testimony and by intervening in Cranmer’s arraignment for heresy to forestall further 
examination by his peers.    
5 In reality of course women were legally debarred from taking up any of these roles. For a summary of 
the manifold legal disabilities women endured in sixteenth and seventeenth century England, see Tim 
Stretton, Women Waging Law in Elizabethan England (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 21‐5. 
6 
 
staged in the great scenes of choric female lament in Richard III? And in what ways might we think of the 
plays’ female lamenters as a symbolic embodiment of the ‘conscience of the nation’? 6 These are the 
principal issues that will inform our analysis of the plays’ female‐driven crusade to cure England of its 
ills. 
 
The politics of truth‐telling 
It is well documented that Shakespeare went out of his way to amplify the political dimensions of  
the female roles in all three plays by expanding on existing details in the chronicles or by inventing a 
public profile for them to offset the absence of such material in his sources.7  One of the key functions 
the playwright(s) assigns to these ‘tell‐tale women’  is that of speaking truth, as they understand it, to 
those in positions of power. Each of them makes liberal use of the rhetorical figure of ‘frank speech’ or 
outspokenness (known as parrhesia in Greek, licentia in Latin) where the speaker feels compelled by a 
sense of duty to the truth to set aside considerations of the ‘reverence’ or ‘fear’ owed to authority and 
exercise his ‘right to speak out, because[he] seem[s] justified in reprehending them ... for some fault’.8  
Peacham’s gloss on parrhesia in the 1593 edition of The Garden of Eloquence comes nearest to 
adumbrating the uses to which this ‘aggressive frankness’ is put by Shakespeare’s female protagonists:  
This figure serveth to insinuate, admonish, and reprehend ... which is the onely forme that 
boldly delivereth to great dignitaries and most high degrees of men, the message of justice and 
equitie, sparing neither magistrates that pervert lawes, nor Princes that do abuse their 
kingdomes.9 
                                                             
6This phrase is used a propos of Constance by A.R. Braunmuller in the Oxford edition of King John (Oxford, 
1989), p.63. 
7 See, e.g., Harold Brooks, ‘Richard III, unhistorical amplifications: the women’s scenes and Seneca’, 
Modern Language Review, 75 (1980), pp.721‐37; Juliet Dusinberre, ‘King John and embarrassing women’, 
Shakespeare Survey, 42 (1989), p. 39; Gordon McMullen’s Arden 3 edition of Henry VIII, p.321 (headnote).   
8 Rhetorica Ad Herennium, IV.37.49. Quoted in David Colclough, ‘Parrhesia: The Rhetoric of Free Speech in 
Early Modern England’, Rhetorica 17/2 (1999), pp. 184‐5.  
9 Henry Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence (1593), quoted in Colclough, Ibid., p. 206. 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As this passage reveals, the rhetorical handbooks generally assume parrhesia to be a feature of male 
political dialogue. That such bold and forthright speech issues here from the mouths of aristocratic 
women is peculiarly shocking in its refusal to conform to the convoluted protocols of civil discourse 
deemed appropriate to their rank and sex.10 David Colclough notes that early modern discussions of the 
use of this figure frequently emphasise its capacity for ‘dissimulation’ where the speaker seeks to 
ingratiate themselves under the guise of plain‐speaking.11 However, there is not the slightest hint of 
compromise or palliative intent in the curse‐laden invective Margaret reserves for her enemies, or the 
accusations publicly levelled by Constance at the rulers who have betrayed her. Even Katherine, usually 
more circumspect of speech, as befits a royal consort, is provoked by Wolsey’s disingenuous denials of 
wrong‐doing into abandoning her customary composure and verbal restraint.  If, as James Scott has 
argued, the familiar maxim of speaking truth to power is more often honoured in the breach than the 
observance, subordinate groups being accustomed to dissembling their grievances by expressing them, 
if at all, in oblique or encoded forms to avoid incurring their masters’ displeasure, then these characters 
may be said to constitute a rare deviation from this rule.12 For examples of such decorous encryption of 
dissent are remarkably thin on the ground in these plays.  In fact the women’s astonishingly direct 
denunciations of wrong‐doing spare neither corrupt ‘magistrates’ nor ‘Princes that do abuse their 
Kingdomes’.  
 It is predictable, then, that the women’s stand against injustice should take the form of an assault on 
the deviousness of male political rhetoric.  A familiar scenario unfolds where discursive exchanges 
between members of the governing class are disrupted by the interjections of female complainants who 
interrogate their handling of the business of governance, justice or warfare and challenge the official 
                                                             
10 Cf. George Puttenham’s criticism of the French Princess who vented her frustration at being debarred 
from inheriting the throne with blunt vulgarity as ill‐becoming ‘the greatness of her person, and much 
lesse her sex’ , in The Arte of English Poesie (Menston, [1598] 1968), pp. 223‐4. 
11 Colclough., ‘Parrhesia’, pp. 194‐5.  
12 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance (New Haven and London, 1990), Chap. 6. 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rationale for the policies being pursued. In the process they raise awkward questions about the validity 
of the principles – of legitimacy, succession, justice, truth and conscience – on which the characters 
stake their reputations.  Their self‐appointed mission to expose corruption in high places translates into 
an attempt to dissect and demystify the pieties, empty moralising and righteous self‐exculpation in 
which power wraps itself. Instead of submitting to state‐sanctioned accounts of past or unfolding 
events, their energies are channelled into countering the distortions, evasions and omissions proffered 
by the political establishment in lieu of truth. Setting the record straight is their prime objective. While 
their main tactic is to cut through this obfuscatory language by rewording what has taken place in a 
pointedly different set of terms that reflect a combative, irreverent and profoundly suspicious attitude 
towards official historiography and the governing elite in whose interests it is shaped. Their plain‐
speaking obviously serves them well as a mechanism for flushing out unpalatable truths.  However, this 
is only the most sensational tactic in what is, by any standards, an impressive arsenal of rhetorical 
devices at their disposal that includes ‘exclamation’ (i.e. accusation, voluble complaint), the use of  
lamentation, ironic asides, savage mockery, and the wresting of another’s meaning to reveal a sombre 
side of England’s heritage that seeps through the censorship imposed on it.  
The daring ingenuity with which this rhetorical form of guerrilla warfare is conducted merits closer 
analysis. In Richard III Margaret is, unhistorically, brought back from the dead as a ghostly revenant and 
living witness to the crimes committed in the civil wars. In I.3 she eavesdrops on the wrangling between 
Richard and the Woodville clan, punctuating their exchanges with sarcastic interjections that echo and, 
in so doing, subvert the self‐righteous posturing of the disputants by commenting bitterly on the 
illegitimacy of their claims to the moral high ground. Impatient of their weasel words, she reminds both 
parties how they stole their honours from the Lancastrian line by no less barbarous means than they 
condemn in her.  She rounds this off with a comprehensive and savagely worded curse that prophesies 
their collective downfall to the evident perturbation of all present. In 4.4 Margaret’s inquisitorial 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function is taken over by the Duchess of York and Queen Elizabeth, as they join forces to waylay Richard 
and “charge” him with a catalogue of crimes. Throughout this scene Elizabeth is shown not only to 
possess greater political guile than the ‘Poor painted Queen’ (3.1.239) of Margaret’s description but to 
have absorbed the lesson of her rhetorical tactics. In the ensuing stichomythic skirmish between herself 
and Richard, she succeeds in upstaging him by turning the intended sense of his words back on him, 
until her opponent, wrong‐footed and disconcerted, begs her to ‘[b]e not so hasty to confound my 
meaning’ (4.4.248). 
 The interrogation of  ‘usurped authority’ is revived in the central scenes (2.1 and 3.1) of King John 
where the question of who has the stronger claim to the English throne, John or Arthur, is fiercely 
disputed with words and arms by the English and French Kings and their allies. But, once again, it is the 
women who ensure that the matter is not allowed to rest there. In the so‐called ‘Billingsgate scene’, 
Constance and Eleanor launch into a slanging match over the symbolically‐loaded question of legitimacy, 
each accusing the other of ill‐founded ambition and their children of bastardy.  At first there seems little 
point to this cat‐fight beyond pandering to clichés of female rivalry. However, the very aspects of this 
scene that the play’s critics and on‐stage audience find most embarrassing13 can be taken as an ironic, 
albeit inadvertent, commentary on the main political action. By referring  back to the semi‐farcical 
accommodation reached by the Bastard and his brother over their inheritance rights in 1.1, and forward 
to the equally absurd claims and counter‐claims to be England’s lawful representative asserted by the 
opposing monarchs before the walls of Angers , this scene strips the central plot of its pretensions to 
dignity, principles and moral seriousness . When Constance falls victim to these same political 
manoeuvrings  ‐ King Philip and ‘Austria’ having been suborned by the enticements of ‘tickling 
Commodity’ to desert her cause – she resumes the offensive, accusing her former champions of 
reneging on their vows and Philip, specifically, of having ‘beguiled’ the world ‘with a counterfeit/ 
                                                             
13 See Dusinberre, ‘King John’, pp. 40‐41. 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Resembling majesty, which being touched and tried/ Proves valueless’ (3.1.25‐7). She then proceeds to 
sabotage Philip’s attempts to whitewash what the Bastard calls ‘a most base and vile‐concluded peace’ 
(2.1.587); when the French King proclaims the occasion of his defection to be a day of celebration, she 
pounces on the phrase ‘holy day’: 
A wicked day, and not a holy day! 
What hath this day deserved? What hath it done, 
That it in golden letters should be set 
Among the high tides in the calendar? 
Nay, rather turn this day out of the week, 
This day of shame, oppression, perjury. (3.1.9‐14) 
In Constance’s anatomising of his speech the collusion between a false nomenclature and political 
subterfuge is laid bare. 
Constance’s intrepid “outing” of shameful truths finds its mirror image in Katherine. At the pre‐trial 
hearing of the evidence against Buckingham in I.2, the Queen hijacks proceedings from the very outset 
by forcing onto the agenda the question of Wolsey’s unauthorised taxation of the commoners (hitherto 
concealed from the King) and by speaking out in defence of their interests.  The cardinal’s efforts to 
evade blame for these extortionate measures are robustly dismissed by Katherine who interrupts the 
hearing to cast further aspersions on the probity of Wolsey’s proceedings against his known enemy. At 
the tribunal for Henry’s divorce suit she again breaks with judicial protocols in ways that recall, while 
going beyond, Holinshed’s more subdued account in the 1587 edition of the Chronicles.14 First, she 
insists on pleading her own ‘cause’ directly to the King, instead of letting her clerical counsel represent 
her as custom demanded; then she quits the court in defiance of its orders, resolving never to submit to 
                                                             
14 Cf. Raphael Holinshed, Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland (London, 1808 [1587]), vol. 3, 
pp.736‐740. 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interrogation thereafter. In short, Shakespeare’s Katherine is distinctly less tractable than Holinshed’s,  
reflecting her more pronounced scepticism regarding the quality of justice she stands to receive, ‘having 
here/No judge indifferent, nor no more assurance/Of equal friendship and proceeding’ (2.4.14‐16). 
Moreover, this queen persists in querying the cardinals’ motives, where Holinshed’s rapidly yielded 
under pressure.  The accused turns accuser with a blistering speech, invented for her, in which she 
impugns Wolsey’s impartiality and asserts her right to refer her case to papal arbitration. In denying his 
competency to pass judgment on her, Katherine refuses in effect to recognise the court’s jurisdiction. A 
bolder challenge to the judicial system, contesting as it does both royal and ecclesiastical authority over 
legal matters, is hard to imagine. 
Our admiration for the audacity with which these tactics are deployed in the service of equity and truth 
should not deter us, though, from observing that the women’s conduct is no less vulnerable to critical 
scrutiny than those they indict. Indeed their active involvement in political life ought to caution us 
against overstating their exteriority to the systems against which they rail, for, like the Bastard and a 
host of other well‐intentioned but complicitous courtiers, all of them are to varying degrees implicated 
in the unsavoury operations of power they are intent on challenging. Given the difficulty of deciphering 
the characters‘  fluctuating motives and intentions,  it is all the more necessary to resist the temptation 
to postulate a simplistic antithesis that segregates women, imagined as pristine repositories of truth, 
from the venal practices of the court. The complex tangle of personal and public objectives, of self‐
interest and civic‐mindedness,  that impels them to speak out frustrates such categorical neatness. We 
need only consider Elizabeth’s obscurely motivated rapprochement with her children’s murderer, or 
Constance’s eagerness to align herself with whichever side happens to be opposing King John, to 
appreciate that these figures are in no way exempt from the climate of moral and epistemological 
ambiguity that envelops these plays.  To presume that the speech acts of these royal women are 
intrinsically more trustworthy than their opponents’ would therefore be rash. In fact we may conclude 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that the equivocal nature of their position – at once detached from and deeply embedded in a national 
malaise for which they are partly accountable ‐ further compromises their status as truth‐tellers. Against 
this it might be objected that their ability to view events from both within and outside the hegemonic 
order ‐  like the Bastard who, significantly, aligns himself with Constance in this respect ‐  gives them an 
unrivalled advantage  in terms of understanding the corrosive effects of ‘commodity’ on political life.  
Using the evidence furnished by our three plays, the following sections will assess the effectiveness of 
female complaint not just as a tool for exposing the abuses of the time, but as a means of putting them 
right. This will require an analysis of the conditions that might enable a productive synthesis to be 
forged between different facets of this genre – proficiency in the art of lamentation, an ability to 
manipulate its legal associations, and its use as a vehicle for collective political protest.    
 
Complaint and the law 
Much has been made in recent years of the correspondences between literature and law. That their 
interconnectedness was taken for granted as an axiomatic feature of early modern culture is 
corroborated by a rapidly expanding body of scholarship devoted to investigating this field. These 
affinities manifested themselves in various ways, but at the most basic level they were inscribed in the 
use of a common vocabulary. As John Kerrigan notes, ‘complaint’ originated as a technical term referring 
to ‘the kind of bill submitted by a “plaintiff”’ prior to court proceedings, though its meaning would be 
extended to cover ‘many sorts of articulate dissatisfaction’.15 Other affiliated words – including to 
‘arraign’, ‘indict’ or ‘accuse’ someone – sustained this dual valency, possessing a specific legal sense 
whilst also yielding a broader “lay” meaning. These ambiguous terms of reference helped stake out a 
shared discursive terrain that could be mined by practitioners of either discipline. Importantly, the 
                                                             
15 John Kerrigan, Motives of Woe: Shakespeare and ‘Female Complaint’ (Oxford, 1991), p.7. 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traffic of influence flowed in both directions. Legal historians have shown how deeply indebted canon 
(and civil) law were to the ‘topics’ of Roman forensic oratory which enabled the construction and 
evaluation of evidentiary proof.16 By the end of the sixteenth century these rhetorically derived 
categories had been assimilated into English common law where they became the grounds for 
determining a defendant’s guilt or innocence in the absence of irrefutable evidence. Conversely, Lorna 
Hutson maintains that the same techniques of probable reasoning used by prosecutors and juries were 
enlisted by early modern dramatists and poets as a handy device for inventing cohesive plots, plausible 
arguments and lifelike characters.17 These analogies are certainly seductive, but how robust are they 
when put to the test? Is there any literary evidence to suggest that the pseudo‐legal idioms of complaint 
can ever serve as an adequate substitute for the rigors of the law?  
Of all the popular literary genres of this period none exploited their connections with forensic rhetoric 
more vigorously than complaint in its many and various guises. Female‐voiced examples of erotic 
versions of narrative and poetic complaint, in particular, offer an exceptionally rich source of penitential 
narratives in which fallen women lament their sexual transgressions while simultaneously seeking to 
exculpate themselves.18 However, it is to early editions of the Mirror for Magistrates ‐ whose de casibus 
format supplied a template for Richard III and perhaps Henry VIII19 ‐  that we must look for a tighter fit 
with the politically and legalistically oriented concerns of our Shakespearean complainants. Of particular 
relevance here are the monologues ventriloquised by the ghosts of ‘Shore’s wife’ and ‘Eleanor, Duchess 
of Gloucester’ (printed in the 1563 and 1578 editions respectively) who beg ‘leave to plead [their] case 
at large’ in language awash with legal terminology as they seek to repair their shattered reputations 
                                                             
16See Barbara Shapiro, ‘Classical Rhetoric and the English Law of Evidence’, in Victoria Kahn and Lorna 
Hutson (eds) Rhetoric and Law in Early Modern Europe (New Haven and London, 2001), pp.54‐72. 
17 Hutson, The Invention of Suspicion: Law and Mimesis in Shakespeare and Renaissance Drama (Oxford, 
2008), Chap. 3. 
18 See, e.g., Samuel Daniel’s The Complaint of Rosalind’ (1592) and Michael Drayton’s ‘The Epistle of 
Rosamond to King Henry the Second’ in Englands Heroicall Epistles (1597) 
19 As argued by Paul Budra in ‘A Mirror for Magistrates’ and the de casibus Tradition (Toronto, 2000), p.79. 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from beyond the grave. Like their dramatic counterparts, they are adept at exploiting their ‘piteous case’ 
by presenting this in the most affecting light possible in the hope of eliciting a more magnanimous 
judgment from their readers than that handed down by their earthly judges.20 But, as with 
Shakespeare’s royal women, these self‐serving manoeuvres coexist with a broader concern for the 
parlous state of the judicial system. Towards the end of her monologue Jane Shore admonishes ‘Ye 
Princes all, and Rulers everychone’ not to ‘forget to joyne your justice right’:    
You should not judge til thinges be wel deserned, 
Your charge is styll to mainteyne upryght lawes, 
In conscience rules ye should be throughly learned, 
Where clemencie byds wrath and rashenes pawes, 
And further sayeth, stryke not wythout a cause, 
And when ye smite do it for Justice sake, 
Then in good part eche man your skourge wil take. (ll.344‐50) 
But while the sentiments expressed may be similar, there are obvious differences not only of character 
(Shakespeare’s  complainants are impenitent and pugnacious) but, more importantly, of genre. Encased 
within the homiletic framework of narrative complaint and subject to its monovocal conventions, these 
female voices elicit no response except from their editors. Consequently their brave words remain little 
more than rhetorical flourishes.   
By contrast, Constance, Katherine and the other aggrieved complainants of these plays inhabit a more 
dialogic, spacious and fully realised imaginative realm where their hopes, words and actions are liable to 
be either thwarted or confirmed.  Not only does the dereliction of justice within their respective play‐
words oblige them to take matters into their own hands, but they use the law’s failure to offer them 
either protection or remedy against the injuries sustained by themselves and others to justify their 
                                                             
20Lily B. Campbell (ed.), The Mirror for Magistrates (Cambridge, 1938), p.385. 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encroachment on male prerogatives. This is precisely the point Constance makes when she claims ‘no 
less law and warrant’ than the papal legate to curse her adversaries on the paradoxical (and morally 
dubious grounds) that ‘when the law can do no right,/ Let it be lawful that law bar no wrong’ (3.1.112‐
113).  The search for alternative forms of redress propels these dramatic complainants beyond the mere 
elaboration of judicial analogies, of the type found in the Mirror, into attempting to translate these 
figures of speech into practical action. Hence their recourse to the rhetoric of complaint which they 
deploy as though it were a remedial supplement or proxy for the law, to the point of mimicking specific 
procedures employed in early modern courts of law.  Let us reconsider, for example, Constance’s 
attempts to legitimise her cursing by equating this with Pandolf’s delegated authority to pronounce the 
act of excommunication against King John. This tacitly invites us to view the imprecations uttered by 
Margaret, the Duchess of York and Constance herself as divinely authorised speech acts that exclude the 
offender from participating in communion with Catholic Church and, by extension, from divine grace.21 
Significantly, though, Pandolph denies the validity of this comparison (III.1.10). Similarly, Constance’s 
litany of complaint against the turncoats, King Philip and ‘Austria’ bears more than a casual resemblance 
to a bill of indictment of the type brought by individual citizens. The former is specifically accused of 
perjury, a criminal offence that normally fell within the jurisdiction of the court of Star Chamber and was 
punishable by a fine or imprisonment.22Yet though Constance succeeds in exposing Philip’s breach of 
faith, she possesses neither the influence nor the material power required to secure more tangible 
forms of reparation.  The problem lies in the disconnection of this speech genre from any formal legal 
process which deprives the judgments enunciated by these female “plaintiffs” of real executive force. 
These examples call upon us to recognise the intrinsic limitations of complaint, but without necessarily 
invalidating the persuasive, ethical and diagnostic qualities that otherwise make this discursive mode so 
                                                             
21 Cf. the Duchess’ curse at 4.4.181‐96 which both consigns Richard to damnation ‘by God’s just 
ordinance’ and disowns him as her son. 
22 See H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, fourth edition (Oxford, 2007), pp.117‐19. 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compelling.  Indeed, as we shall see, our plays bear witness to its capacity to bring intense pressure to 
bear on the accused and even alter the trajectory of history.  
  
Reassessing female complaint 
One remarkable feature of these plays is the unusually high proportion of female characters who are 
also mourners, variously engaged in bewailing the loss of their husbands, kinsmen or offspring or the 
privileges attendant on power.  From pre‐classical antiquity through to the late Medieval cult of the 
mater dolorosa, the business of grieving for the dead and dying, preparing the corpse for burial and 
playing a leading role in funerary rituals was acknowledged to be women’s rightful and peculiar 
province. But, as a consequence of the seismic upheavals of the Reformation, that time‐honoured 
tradition was ruptured and the histrionic display of female sorrow – invoking a corporeal lexicon of 
weeping, wailing, vociferous lamentation, and dishevelled hair – came to be viewed in a far more 
ambivalent light.23  Patricia Phillippy has shown how epistemic shifts in attitudes to female mourning in 
the post‐Reformation era led to a cultural devaluation of, and attempts to restrict, older and more 
extravagant forms of female grieving in favour of an ethic of inward and measured mourning.  This 
distinction was formulated along sharply drawn gender lines, the self‐contained, male Protestant 
subject being defined in part ‘through his opposition to stigmatized female lamentational practices’  
now deemed to be ‘excessive, violent, and immoderate’.24 Mournful women, especially bereaved 
mothers such as a Queen Elizabeth in Richard III and Constance in King John, are often represented in 
this period as disturbing, even transgressive, figures whose extreme sorrow threatens to overspill the 
parameters of acceptable feminine behaviour. Their culturally scripted performance of grief was also 
                                                             
23  Katharine Goodland explores the sources of ‘England’s profound ambivalence towards mourning 
women’ in Female Mourning in Medieval and Renaissance English Drama (Aldershot, 2005), pp. 121‐ 3, 
136‐140. 
24Patricia  Phillippy, Women, Death and Literature in Post‐Reformation England (Cambridge, 2002), pp.7‐9. 
17 
 
deplored as proof of their sex’s natural incapacity to govern their emotions. Ideological concerns about 
female mourning were compounded by its identification in the popular imagination with a retrogressive 
reprisal of pagan and Catholic rituals for honouring the dead. These intersecting factors combined to 
validate the introduction of more stringent patriarchal control over a domain once regarded as the 
preserve of women.   
The same cultural prejudices regarding women’s atavistic propensity to indulge in wild displays of grief 
are echoed within our three plays. Aligning themselves with the dominant reformist stance, the male 
characters are mostly contemptuous of such practices. For example, Richard emphasises the futility of 
Elizabeth’s lament for her recently deceased husband, brusquely admonishing her that ‘none can help 
our harms by wailing them’ (2.2.91). Katherine is also advised by the cardinals to set aside her ‘griefs’ for 
the loss of her former ‘dignities’ and submit herself to the royal will. Likewise, King Philip and Pandolf 
react with a mixture of pity and distaste to Constance’s enactment of her unbounded anguish at the loss 
of Arthur; she is rebuked for ‘hold[ing] too heinous a respect of grief’ (3.4.90) in making her sorrow a 
proxy for her abducted child. Of course it is not hard to find corroborative evidence of the excesses 
imputed to these female characters. None of them could be accused of being ‘barren to bring forth 
complaints’, each being intent on nurturing their woe by ‘pamper[ing] it with lamentation’ (2.2.67, 88). 
Nor do they heed the men’s repeated exhortations to exercise self‐restraint. But that is not to say that 
what seem to us as absurdly over‐the‐top displays of grief are pointless or futile. True, unflattering 
depictions of female lamentation, and complaint in general, as self‐indulgent, intemperate, tediously 
verbose and, above all, ineffectual are widely endorsed in the literature of the period. And, with few 
exceptions, modern critics have followed suit, embracing such dismissive attitudes to this genre without 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bothering to investigate its expressive and instrumental potentialities.25 Nevertheless, we may plausibly 
hazard the view that the popular anxiety and distrust surrounding female mourners was driven less by 
doctrinal issues or worries about women’s lack of rational self‐control than by an implicit recognition of 
the enormous affective potency of female grief and the potentially subversive uses to which it could be 
put.    
Immoderate grief is thus legible as an encoded affirmation of the women’s oppositional stance and, as 
such, is instrumental in shaping their contrary evaluation of complaint. For the female mourners of 
these plays, far from viewing such affective display as fatuous, are keenly aware of the possibility of 
harnessing their own sorrow, along with other neighbouring emotions such as anger, resentment, 
indignation and a sense of loss, for more productive ends.  Without the bitterness of personal grief to 
spur them into action, we are led to surmise, it is debatable whether they would have ventured such a 
comprehensive critique of England’s methods of governance. It is Margaret’s ‘sorrow’s rage’ (1.2.276) 
for the murder of husband and son that continues to fuel her vendetta against the Yorkist faction more 
than a decade after the atrocities perpetrated at Tewkesbury.  And just as Constance’s despondency 
over Philip’s treachery swiftly converts to fury, so at the divorce tribunal Katherine rejects the standard 
script of tearful lamentation and what it betokens – women’s soft, watery disposition – for the fiery, 
choleric qualities thought to typify the male:    
I am about to weep, but thinking that 
We are a queen, or long have dreamed so, certain 
The daughter of a king, my drops of tears 
I’ll turn to sparks of fire. (2.4.68‐71) 
                                                             
25 See, e.g., Heather Dubrow, ‘A Mirror for Complaints: Shakespeare’s Lucrece and Generic Tradition’, in 
Barbara Lewalski (ed.), Renaissance Genres: Essays on History, Theory and Interpretation (Cambridge, MA, 
1986), pp. 399‐417. 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This combustible mixture of grief and ire imbues the women’s speech with an impassioned vehemence, 
steering it away from the plangent accents of lament towards more combative figurative devices, such 
as accusation, exclamation and imprecation. As Philippy remarks, ‘the same characteristic that opens 
women’s mourning to censure [i.e. excessive grief] enables its use as a means of authorizing and 
empowering women’s speech’; here it not only licenses the airing of social discontent, but greatly 
intensifies the persuasive force with which this is communicated.26 
In short, Shakespeare’s royal women, unlike their male counterparts, generally place their trust in the 
forensic capacities of complaint, presuming that its ethically and emotionally charged discourse 
possesses considerable illocutionary force. Faced with Buckingham’s scornful dismissal of the utility of 
imprecation, Margaret clings tenaciously to the belief that her words have power to influence divine 
agency itself (1.3.285‐8) ‐ a conviction her adversaries will come to share as they succumb one by one to 
the fates prophesied for them. In IV.4 the Duchess of York and Elizabeth debate the question of ‘[w]hy 
should calamity be full of words?’.  Elizabeth subscribes to the commonplace belief that plaintive 
speeches are ineffectual, merely ‘[w]indy attorneys to their client woes,/ ...Poor breathing orators of 
miseries’; the best they can do is ‘ease the heart’. However, the Duchess persuades her daughter‐in‐law 
to reject this pessimistic view  of complaint, urging her to ‘[b]e copious in exclaims’ when confronting 
Richard ; if he tries to ‘drown’ their voices with ‘martial music’, they will retaliate by ‘smother[ing]’ him 
‘in the breath of bitter words’ (4.4.126‐154). The properties  ascribed here to female complaint  – a 
power to overwhelm the party accused with a battery of exclamation, to ‘envenom’ them with vitriolic 
reproof and to ‘pierce’ their conscience – are confirmed by numerous dramatic examples attesting to its 
capacity to induce disquiet in the recipient. Hastings begs Margaret to ‘end [her] frantic curse’, 
confessing that his ‘hair doth stand on end’ to hear them (1.3.245, 302). Even Richard struggles to 
                                                             
2626 Cf. Goodland’s comment on the ambiguities of complaint as ‘excessive yet inadequate, shunned and 
feared, yet necessary and efficacious’ (Female Mourning, p.1). 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maintain his trademark sardonic flippancy when exposed to his mother and sister‐in‐law’s concerted 
indictment in 4.4. Clearly unnerved by the ferocity of his mother’s denunciation and her parting curse, 
he complains that her speech is ‘too bitter’ and makes desperate attempts to placate her. Kings Philip 
and John are equally apprehensive about Constance’s reaction to news of the Anglo‐French alliance, 
hoping to deflect her fury by offering concessions in the form of land and titles. But John’s anxious wish 
that they might ‘in some measure satisfy her [will] so / That we shall stop her exclamation’ (2.1.556‐9) 
implicitly concedes that her protests are too cogent and forceful to be stifled. 
Despite such heroic acts of resistance, however, these women appear a spent force well before the end 
of their respective plays. Overtaken by events and relegated to the margins of the political arena, they 
are increasingly ground down by the onslaught of old and fresh woes. In their latter appearances on 
stage, their sorrow is figured as a crushing ‘burden’ under which the owner ‘sinks’ ‐ an idea materialised 
via the conventional theatrical gesture for indicating overwhelming grief:  sitting or lying down on the 
stage (cf. Richard III, 4.4.21‐8; Henry VIII, 4.2.1‐3). But while their deteriorating fortunes appear to 
confirm the equation between female complaint and impotence, they vehemently repudiate this notion. 
Instead it is insinuated that their accumulated misery confers on those who have suffered so much a 
restorative dignity and authority that commands respect. This is certainly the view taken by Constance 
when she refuses  to attend on the English and French kings, bidding them rather pay their obeisance to 
‘the state of [her] great grief’:  
I will instruct my sorrows to be proud, 
For grief is proud and makes his owner stoop. 
[She sits upon the ground] 
To me and to the state of my great grief 
Let kings assemble, for my grief’s so great 
That no supporter but the huge firm earth 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Can hold it up. Here I and sorrows sit. 
Here is my throne; bid kings come bow to it. (2.2.68‐74) 
The women of Richard’s household also demand that due homage be paid to their wretched state, 
implicitly presenting themselves as an exemplary pattern of maternal grief after Hecuba. Margaret, who 
vies with the Duchess of York for the title of Queen of Woes, urges that ‘[i]f ancient sorrow be most 
reverend, /Give mine the benefit of seniory./ And let my griefs frown on the upper hand’ (4.4.35‐7). 
Katherine too clings to the prerogatives of grief, chastising the messenger of IV.2 for failing to show the 
‘reverence’ owed to her ‘state’.27 Ironically, it would seem that the weight of their afflictions merely 
enhances the protagonists’ moral stature. Moreover, the toll it takes on them is less debilitating than we 
might anticipate. Even as they enter the ‘last fit of [their] greatness’ (Henry VIII, 3.1.77), they continue to 
publicise their grievances with undiminished vigour and to reject the false consolation offered them.  
Right up to her final moments on stage Constance spurns her male comforters’ belittlement of her grief 
(‘Lady, you utter madness, and not sorrow’ [3.4.43]) by refuting the early modern elision of female 
distress with insanity, insisting that her distracted behaviour has a rational foundation (cf. Richard III, 
1.3.252 Henry VIII, 3.1.112). This simple refusal to let themselves be silenced is arguably the 
complainants’ strongest card in their struggle against injustice. 
 
Embodying the nation 
Although generated in the first instance by personal grief, it is important to note that complaint lends 
itself to being read within a broader literary context as an extended metaphor for the sufferings of the 
nation at large. I would venture to suggest that Shakespeare’s sorrowful mothers are the progeny of, 
and participate in, a venerable tradition of using emblematic female figures to embody and give voice to 
                                                             
27 In each of these contexts we may assume that ‘state’ is being usually polysemically, to refer to the 
character’s psychological condition (OED, I.2), their high rank (II.1) and a throne (II.2). 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the grievances of the common subject.28  Many of the complaints and petitions, printed in pamphlet 
form, that poured off the presses in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are ventriloquised by 
female personifications of England or of its various regions and cities, particularly London. Parallel 
instances of this gendered use of prosopopeia  as a medium for lamenting the nation’s ills are to be 
found across a variety of other literary genres.29 Just as ‘England is insistently personified as a woman 
and mother’ in Shakespeare’s King John30, so these female speakers conventionally style themselves as 
‘nursing mothers’ to the nation’s citizenry. They typically bewail the harms that have befallen their 
‘children’, such as their affliction by poverty or disease, or, alternatively, berate their misguised offspring 
for straying from the path of righteousness. Thus in Englands Threnodie, or a briefe and homely 
discoverie of some jealousies and grievances under which the kingdom at present groaneth , Lady Anglia 
laments the damage inflicted by the Civil War and reproves her ‘dear children’ for allowing the country 
to descend into ‘open wickedness’, sectarianism and political disunity, while the maternal speaker of 
Vox Civitatis, or LONDONS complaint against her children in the COUNTRIE deplores the fact that her 
faithless progeny have forsaken the city at the first sign of pestilence or have become embroiled in 
dissolute  behaviour.31  More directly pertinent to the situation of the plays’ grieving women are 
complaints relating to the sporadic outbreaks of the plague during this period that milk the pathos of 
maternal anguish not simply for the purpose of  arousing sympathy but to make a political point. Like 
Constance or the bereaved mothers of Richard III, the speaker of Londons Mourning Garment, figured as 
a childless widow, recalls her affectionate solicitude for her dead children and husband, victims of the 
                                                             
28 For a general discussion of this allegorical tradition, see Marina Warner, Monuments and Maidens 
(London, 1985), esp. on representations of Britannia, Anglia’s successor (pp. 45‐55). 
29 Cf. Widow Ynglond, in John Bale’s polemical anti‐Catholic play, King Johan (first performed in 1538),  
who ‘complaineth ... grieviously’ of the impoverishment and oppression inflicted on her children by 
clerical abuses;  and grieving widow Belge who laments the loss of her sons [provinces] in Spenser’s Faerie 
Queene, V.10.6‐14. For French parallels, see Kate Van Orden, ‘Female Complaintes: Laments of Venus, 
Queens and City Women in Late Sixteenth‐Century France’, Renaissance Quarterly, 54: 3 (2001), pp.818‐
35. 
30 Braunmuller, King John, p.71. 
31 See Alexander Ross, Englands Threnodie (1648), pp. 1‐8, and Benjamin Spenser, Vox Civitatis (1636). 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disease, in intimate and touching detail as she laments her plight.32 Addressing the ‘Dames of London 
Cittie’, she exhorts them to ‘remember well’ what they have lost: 
And now my harts, olde Widdowes and yong wives, 
And you that in silence, sit so sad and mute: 
You that wring hands, as weary of your lives, 
Heare London speake, she will expresse your suite. 
I know your sighes, is for your tender fruite. 
Fruite in the budde, in blossome ripe and growne, 
All deare to you, now death hath made his owne.  
By drawing the reader(s) into her retrospectively imagined life as a mother, the speaker seeks to create 
an empathetic community of mourners around this (‘Is there no wife nor widdow that will hye,/ And 
reach a hand that hath some sorrowes felt,/ My griefes are more then I my selfe can welde’). Within this 
enlarged context the theme of the untimely death of children expands beyond the speaker’s personal 
experience to encompass new meanings, and as it does so this master‐trope begins to resonate with 
other, more overtly politicised, kinds of loss. In Londons Mourning Garment the insistently repeated 
injunction to recollect the dead acquires a similar function to the commemorative acts performed in our 
plays, serving as a point of departure for the expression of a range of socio‐economic grievances by 
drawing attention to the economic hardship and callous wastage of human life endured by the labouring 
poor. Such complaints often incorporate an impassioned plea to the state or civic authorities calling on 
them to alleviate this history of social injustice and ‘have respect/ To poor mens livelihoods’33 which, 
whether heeded by its intended recipients or not, is likely to have struck a powerful chord with their 
popular readership.      
                                                             
32 William Muggins, Londons Mourning Garment (1603), STC 18248. This text is discussed by Phillippy in 
Women, Death and Literature, Chap. 4. 
33 Ross, Englands Threnodie, p.4 
24 
 
In the plays themselves the socio‐political reverberations of plaintive speech are similarly amplified and 
supported by the construction of a community of ill‐assorted women bound together by their mutual 
losses in a manner characteristic of the collectivist ethos of this genre. The parallel activities of these 
female complainants, once bitterly at loggerheads with one another, begin to converge not only within 
but across their play‐worlds.  An important indicator of this nascent co‐operation is the willingness of 
former adversaries to offer each other  emotional support as well as instruction in the art of grieving, as 
when Margaret  teaches the woman who supplanted her how to make her curses more ‘sharp and 
pierc[ing]’ by meditating on the loss of her ‘tender babes’ (4.4.116‐25). Growing evidence of such 
collaborative endeavour inaugurates a new phase where the female rivalry and antagonism that has 
dominated the plot for so long yields to a groundswell of empathetic solidarity. This is reflected most 
clearly in the shifting emphasis of the two great scenes of antiphonal lament in Richard III (2.2 and 4.4).  
Initially used to underscore the women’s competitive striving for precedence, the repetitive syntactical 
patterns and echoic rhetorical structures of these ensemble set‐pieces come to express a united sense 
of purpose that is predicated on the speakers’ shared status as Richard’s victims. Take, for example:  
DAUGHTER  [Clarence’s to Queen Elizabeth] 
Our fatherless distress was left unmoaned; 
Your widow‐dolour likewise be unwept. (2.2.64‐5) 
 
DUCHESS OF YORK 
Was never mother had so dear a loss! 
Alas, I am the mother of these griefs, 
Their woes are parcelled; mine is general. (2.2.79‐82) 
Compare this with: 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QUEEN ELIZABETH 
Poor heart, adieu. I pity thy complaining. 
ANNE, DUCHESS OF GLOUCESTER 
No more than with my soul I mourn for yours. (4.1.87‐8) 
 
QUEEN ELIZABETH [to Richard] 
Tell me, thou villain‐slave, where are my children? 
DUCHESS OF YORK 
Thou toad, thou toad, where is thy brother Clarence? 
And little Ned Plantagenet his son? 
QUEEN ELIZABETH 
Where is the gentle Rivers, Vaughan, Gray?  
DUCHESS OF YORK 
Where is kind Hastings? (4.4.144‐8) 
 
A more subdued version of the rituals of collective female grieving occurs in Katherine’s penultimate 
scene where Henry’s cast‐off queen asks her loyal servants to dispel her sorrow by reflecting this back at 
her in their music‐making . Even Margaret’s implacable vindictiveness abates as she begins to entertain 
the notion that ‘sorrow can admit society’ (4.4.38). The choric complaints engendered by the 
rapprochement between Richard’s female relations and his enemies are enhanced by their rhetorical 
unison to a point where they acquire an irresistible power and intensity. 
These dramatic demonstrations of the companionable nature of female grief raise the question of the 
women’s capacity to transcend their partisan interests and private woes in order to assume the role of 
commentator on the nation’s ills. In actuality, the degree to which this ideal is realised varies markedly 
from one play to the next. Margaret’s reluctance to look beyond her own grudges is mirrored in the 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other women of the Ricardian court who suffer from similar, albeit milder, forms of moral myopia. Less 
solipsistic, Constance fluctuates between an aggressively self‐serving outlook and a more detached 
perspective that allows her to occupy a position comparable to the Bastard’s as a shrewd analyst of the 
ethical and political degeneracy infecting both sides in the Anglo‐French wars. Only Katherine, I would 
argue, emerges with her credibility fully intact as a worthy spokesperson for the public weal. This is not 
because her views are untainted by personal animosity or self‐interest ‐ they clearly are ‐ but because 
she aspires to a standard of impartiality by counterpoising unsparing judgment with charity in 
accordance with the legal concept of equity, as is exemplified by her balanced assessment of her old 
adversary Wolsey’s career in IV.2. Moreover, she is the only female character in these play to show any 
awareness of, and compassion for, the commoners’ plight in her advocacy of their interests.           
Katherine’s authority to represent the nation’s conscience does not rest solely on her own acute moral 
sensibility, however. Her empathy for the plight of her down‐trodden subjects and wish to ease their 
condition is underwritten not only by an allegorical tradition of using female personae to reflect upon 
the tribulations of the body politic, but by the politicised idioms of collective female lament. Another 
instructive comparison was proposed some time ago by Geoffrey Bullough when he suggested that the 
‘wailing queens’ of Richard III fulfil a similar function to the chorus in classical drama.34 Bullough had 
Senecan models in mind, but Greek tragedy, which often features choruses of subjugated barbarian 
women who yet dare to query the policies of their masters, are, I would argue, more germane to our 
plays. The classicist, Helen Foley, has commented on the tendency in tragedy for female lament to 
become a site for the articulation and mobilisation of ‘political or social resistance’ to civic authority, or 
a catalyst for avenging past injuries.  ‘A mourning woman’, she states, ‘is not simply a producer of pity, 
but dangerous’ inasmuch as ‘the message her lament carries is never fully suppressed’.35 In Richard III 
                                                             
34 Geoffrey Bullough, cited in Brooks, ‘Richard III’, p. 721. 
35 Helen Foley, Female Acts in Greek Tragedy (Princeton, 2001), p.55. 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the women’s collective bewailing of their dead kin likewise supplies a crucial focal point for the 
orchestration of resistance to a tyrannical and corrupt regime.  As a form of ‘memorial consciousness’, 
ritual lamentation also facilitates an unbroken communion with the deceased whereby the dead are 
made present.36 It should therefore come as no surprise that a pivotal scene of communal mourning 
(4.4) triggers the chain of events leading directly to the Duchess and Queen Elizabeth’s decision to 
confront Richard with his crimes and culminating in his death. This encounter derives its power not only 
from the vocalisation of powerful feelings, but from their propensity to bring to the surface ‐ that is, into 
public view ‐ things that have long been suppressed in the nation’s political unconscious. It is not only 
Richard’s stifled emotional insecurities or his latent sense of guilt that are aroused by his mother’s 
denunciation. The sequence of events strongly implies a causal connection between the women’s 
recitation of the roll‐call of his victims and the incantatory power of summoning the dead. For in the 
following act England’s past is uncannily resurrected as the spectres of murdered men, women and 
children reappear on stage to add their vengeful curses and accusations to the women’s and confer their 
blessings on Richmond.37  In effect, these two groups – male and female, Yorkist and Lancastrian, the 
living and the dead – merge to form a new, expanded community founded upon their shared hopes and 
fears for the commonweal. 
 Between them, the interventions of the women and ghosts overwhelm Richard, precipitating a crisis of 
conscience from which he never recovers. His tormented psyche turns against itself, envisioning the 
arena of the soul as a courtroom where he is arraigned by his own sins which ‘[t]hrong to the bar, crying 
all “Guilty! guilty!’ (5.5.147‐54).38 Significantly, this process is replicated across all three plays: in each 
                                                             
36 Cf. Goodland, Female Mourning, pp. 13‐14, 16. The term ‘memorial consciousness’ was coined by Pierre 
Nora. 
37 Indeed the varying of set phrases and constructions in the ghosts’ speeches encourages us to view 
these as a continuation of the women’s lamentation. 
38 This is a traditional metaphor: William Perkins likens the conscience to a ‘judge that holdeth an assise, 
& takes notice of inditements, and causeth the most notorious malefactor that is, to hold up his hand at 
the barre of his judgement’ (The Workes of ... Mr. William Perkins, vol. 1 [London, 1612‐13], p. 519). 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case the encounter with a female figure whose demand for justice carries huge symbolic weight appears 
to provoke a chain reaction that persists beyond her demise, as one dormant conscience after another is 
re‐awakened. Following Constance’s disappearance from the stage, Hubert, John and Melun are 
successively galvanised by their twinges of conscience into trying to set matters right. In Henry VIII, too, 
the King’s restive and ambivalent conscience respecting the legality of his marriage is contrasted with 
the Queen’s secure faith in her own as the true infallible source of judgment, and with Wolsey’s 
rediscovery of his long neglected conscience. 
The dramatic prominence given to the emergence of a revitalised private conscience is highly significant. 
What this does, in effect, is relocate the operation of justice by detaching this from its external 
manifestations in the corrupted administration of the law to lodge it within the soul’s interior, self‐
regulatory dialogue with itself.39  Moreover, this faculty, described by William Ames in 1639 as an 
internalised ‘law’ or ‘practicall judgement’ that directs our mental deliberations with regard to ‘morall 
action’, had by the mid‐sixteenth century become barely distinguishable from the principle of equity in 
the eyes of the common law.40 Its re‐surfacing in the latter half of these plays, then, would seem to 
augur well for the body politic’s capacity to heal or mend itself.  Female investment in the ritual 
remembrance of the dead likewise takes on a salvific function, for only by conjuring up the ghosts of 
history’s victims, literally and figuratively, can the sins of the past find remedy and a fractured nation be 
reconciled with itself. In promoting such commemorative acts together with their forthright defence of 
equity, Shakespeare’s royal women may be said to play a crucial role in enabling this process of national 
                                                             
39 Katherine affirms the superiority of conscience, as a form of self‐judgment, over trial by public opinion 
at III.1.29‐37. On the independence of private conscience from external authority, see Camille Well 
Slights, ‘The Politics of Conscience in All is True (or Henry VIII)’, Shakespeare Survey, 42 (1989),  pp. 60‐64. 
40 William Ames, Conscience with the Power and Cases Thereof (1639), pp.2‐4. On the assimilation of 
conscience to the principle of equity, see John Guy, ‘Law, Equity and Conscience in Henrician Juristic 
Thought’, in Alistair Fox and John Guy (eds), Reassessing the Henrician Age: Humanism, Politics and 
Reform, 1500‐1550 (Oxford, 1986), pp. 179‐98. For its importance in jury trials, see Thomas Andrew 
Green, Verdict According to Conscience (Chicago and London, 1985), Chaps. 4 and 5. 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self‐recovery and thereby laying the groundwork for Richmond, the Bastard and Cranmer’s assertive 
visions of a resurgent national self‐confidence. 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